Iran and the Revolution
An exposure of the American Plans
Part 1: Iran and the Revolution
· Roots of U.S - Iranian Relationship
· Mussadiq, U.S & U.K
· U.S Strengthens its foothold in Iran
Part 2: Iran and the Revolution
· Why the need for the Revolution
· Khomeni's role in the Revolution
· The U.S - Khomeni Relationshp
· Evidence from Shah's Memoirs
· Al-Watan Newspaper
Part 3: Iran and the Revolution
· Bazargan's attitude towards U.S
· Hasan Habibi
· Iran - Iraq War
· Dual Containment
Part 4: Iran and the Revolution
Part 1: Iran and the Revolution
"To break the deadlock over compensation to Anglo-Iranin, the US and Britain agreed to accept the principle of Iranian ownership of its oil resources. In return, Iran ceded production and marketing rights which were given a consortium, including 40 percent US participation, that formally ended Britain's oil monopoly in Iran. With the establishment of the Iranian consortium, the US was now the major player in the oil, and the volatile politics, of the Middle East."
The involvement of the colonial powers in the Middle East politically and culturally is evident. On the surface it may appear to some that the West interferes and manipulates the internal affairs of the third world countries to spread their "democratic" values, but the bottom line is imperialism.
As Muslims, it is our obligation to realize and understand howi nternatinal affairs are controlled and how countries such as the US, Britain, and France have a direct influence on our land. In this article we will examine US involvement in Iran, observing the vents such as the oil crises in the 50's, the Mussadiq affair, the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the current US policy towards Iran.
A Brief Historical Overview
Historically, US in the beginning had cultural ties with not just Iran, but with the entire Middle East. Until World War II the missionary efforts in Lebanon, Syria and Iran, extending back into the early years of the 1 9th Century. While, this served the only continuing American interest in the region. Missionaries had made few converts from amongst the Muslims. They did, however, establish schools and colleges to train leaders which served as their catalysts.
In the 1930's American oil companies entered Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. During World War II, US did become involved politically, especially in Saudi Arabia. The meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud in the Great Bitter Lake at Suez in February 1945 symbolized this concern.2
However, before World War II the relationship between the United States and Iran were cordial but distant. The United States had established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1856, but did not send a diplomat of ambassadorial rank until 1944. However, during the late 1 800s and early 1 900s, the US did have missionaries, teachers and archaeologists in Iran. With the World War II raging in Europe, Britain and the Soviet Union jointly invaded Iran in September 1941 to establish a supply route to the Soviet army. The invading forces quickly overpowered the Iranian army and forced Reza IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA Page 3 of 7
Shah out of power, who had established relations with the Germans. Reza Shah was replaced by the British by his twenty one year old son, Muhammad Reza Pahlvai, the late Shah.3 Following the US entry into the war, the United States sent troops to Iran in conjunction with the supply operation, initiating a period in which US-Iranian relations grew rapidly.
Roots of US - Iranian Relationship
In 1942, US established two military missions to balance the British and Russian presence. Of the two military missions, the US Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie (GENMISH) was by far more important than the US Mission to the Iranian Army (ARM1[SH). Under Article 20 of the agreement between Iran and the US in 1943, the head of GENMISH exercised executive control over the internal security force of 25,000 men. He reported directly to the minister of the interior in Tehran.4 Brigadier General Norman H. Norman Schwarzkopf, (father of the Gulf War general Schwarzkopf) was the head of GENMISH and the Gendarmerie. He was appointed to the post in Tehran by Roosevelt. Schwarzkopf virtually ruled the large Iranian force of internal security police (SAVAK). The Gendarmerie took part in the ere-conquest of Azerbaijan in December 1946, which was under Soviet Union control.5 Schwarzkopf, to say the least, became a powerful man. In 1947, he confidently wrote that by the end of 1948 (when the Gendarmerie agreement was to expire) he expected to have the force sufficiently organized to make American command (military) unnecessary. During an audience with the Shah, Schwarzkopf insisted on the need to increase the Gendarmerie to 40,000 men, and when the monarch expressed fear that the force would become the private army of the prime minister, he replied that the nation required such a force because his men had to do much of the work of the army in Azerbaijan and among the tribes.6 The general even had control of the Iranian Majlis, by having 88 votes in it. He boasted this to Wiley, the US ambassador to Iran.7
In 1947 and 1948, the US embassy staff grew considerably in size, enhancing diplomatic, commercial and cultural interactions between the two nations. More importantly, the Office of Strategic Services, the predecessor to the CLN established a station in the Tehran's military attaches and embassy political officers. These covert operations included intelligence-gathering and propaganda operations aimed at the Soviet Union and its allies in Iran, cross-border espionage and subversion raids into Soviet territory, and efforts to map out escape and evasion routes and organize "stay-behind" guerrilla networks for use in the event of a Soviet invasion. Although these operations were all aimed ultimately at the Soviet Union, they did have the effect of straightening or weakening various Iranian political actors during this period8 Consequently, an increasing US involvement in the internal affairs of the country was becoming evident. This fact becomes evident in the Mussadiq affair, the revolution and in the general setup and direction of Iran.
Mussadiq, US, and UK
In the late 1940s, unrest began growing steadily among the politically active in Iran, but mainly by the help of the Americans. This was because of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British-owned firm which was earning large profits from its monopoly over Iran's oil industry. In October of 1949, a group of prominent political figures established an organization known as the National Front to press for political reforms and nationalization of the AlOC's assets in Iran. The National Front became extremely popular and managed to elect eight of its members to the Majlis in late 1949 which was greatly influenced by the American General Schwarzkopf. The National Front was led by Muhammad Mussadiq, a charismatic Majlis deputy from a wealthy land owning family who had established a reputation as an ardent nationalist and democrat. By all accounts, it seems that Mussadiq was brought into power with the American help. This is due to many reasons such as:
Britain had oil monopoly in Iran and Mussadiq called for the end to this by calling for nationalization of the oil industry.
Mussadiq was from a prominent land owning family from prominent tribes. As mentioned earlier, Schwrtzgopf had already been working with many of the tribes to prepare them to take a more active role in the Iranian government.
The US government during this period had renewed their global strategy of containing Soviet's influence. It concluded that a major effort had to be made in Iran to prevent Tudeh Party (communist) from coming to power and delivering Iran into the Soviet hands. The answer to communist was the nationalist Mussadiq.
Razmara, predecessor to Mussadiq was brought in by America's blessing and turned anti-American.9 Therefore, Razmara was assassinated. After the assassination, the Majlis nominated Mussadiq for the primership. As stated above, Schwarzkopf, the American General had said that he had considerable influence over the Majlis.
After Mussadiq assumed office, the Truman administration publicly expressed strong support for him. Recognizing that he could serve an effective alternative to the Tudeh Party. "Washington concluded that Iran must be kept in the Western camp at all costs because of its strategic location and that a protracted oil crisis might weaken the US economy and threaten US and Western security. Accordingly, for the remainder of Truman's term in office the administration pursued a policy of supporting Mussadiq, opposing British efforts to overthrow him, and attempting to mediate an agreement that would satisfy both parties to the oil dispute and minimize disruption of the world oil market." 10
US brought Mussadiq to power, so that US would0btain their share of oil wealth from Iran. During the same period, the US had already reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia for sharing the oil resources based on a 50-50 plan. 1 l After coming to power, the first thing Mussadiq did was to nationalize the oil on April 29, 1951. Nationalization of the oil posed threat to Britains weak economy and dwindling prestige, so the nationalization decree initiated a confrontation between Britain and Iran. This lead Britain to start covert operations in Iran, none of which succeeded. Britain then persuaded major world oil companies to boycott Iranian oil exports. The British also imposed a series of bilateral economic sanctions on Iran and began an ominous military buildup in the region. In September 1951, British officials began implementing a plan to invade southwestern Iran and seize the oil fields. When US officials were told about this plan, President Truman notified British Prime Minister Clement Attlee that the US would not support an invasion and urged him to resume negotiations with Iran over the oil dispute. As a result, Attlee was force to abandon the invasion plan, telling his cabinet that "in view of the attitude of the United States government, [he did not] think it would be expedient to use force" in Iran. 12 Soon after the oil nationalization law was enacted, US officials began to implement a plan to ease the effect of the British oil blockade on the world oil market. Under this plan US oil companies were asked to provide oil to US allies that had been adversely affected by the blockade. Although this effort was intended to help stabilize the world oil market, it also reinforced the oil blockade and therefore inadvertently helped to weaken the Iranian economy and undermine Mussadiq's popular support. At the same time, US officials began a concerted effort to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the oil dispute. They advised the British to accept nationalization of the AIOC and agree to a 50/50 division of profits with Iran. However, the attempt failed.
US Strengthens its foothold in Iran
A few months latter, US was able to strike a secret deal with Shah's sister, Princess Ashraf.
In the deal, Iran conceded production and marketing rights which were given to a consortium, including 40% US participation. This formally ended the British oil monopoly in Iran.13After the deal was reached by the Americans, the CIA officers in Tehran began to turn some of their anti-Soviet covert operations in directions that undermined Mussadiqis base of support. Under a propaganda operation code-named BEDAMN, they distributed newspaper articles and cartoons that depicted Mussadiq as corrupt and immoral and portrayed him as exploiting Aytullah Kashani. They provided financial assistance to certain clergymen to drive them away from Mussadiq. CIA officers had long-standing ties to the Pan-Iranist Party and the Toiler's Party (both had strongly supported Mussadiq) made efforts to turn these organizations against Mussadiq. In a particular noteworthy case, two CIA officers in the fall of 1952 approached Baqai, who had headed the Toiler' Party, encouraging him to break with IRAN ARTICLE FROM KHALIFORNIA Page 6 of 7
Mussadiq and giving him money. Similar approaches may have been made to Kashani, Makki. and other prominent figures."l4 By November 1952 both the Pan-Iranists and Toilersi Party had split into pro and anti-Mussadiq factions; Kashani, Makki, Baqai, and other National Front leaders had openly turned against Mussadiq, thanks to the heavy covert efforts by the CIA. Hand in hand with the CIA, the British were carrying out very similar, but more extensive covert activities against Mussadiq. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, who had been heading British intelligence operation in Iran, was sent to Washington in November to present US officials with a plan to oust Mussadiq.15 The plan called for a coordinated uprising to be engineered by the Rashidians and certain Bakhtiari tribal elements, with or without the Shahis approval. On February 3, 1953, two weeks after the Eisenhower inauguration, top US and British officials met in Washington and made a decision to develop and carry out a plan to work together in order to over throw Mussadiq. By using the BEDAMN network, CIA carried out extensive propaganda barrage against Mussadiq and organized antigovernment and anti-Tudeh demonstrations, adding considerably to the turmoil that was engulfing Tehran. They sought the support of top military officers, arranging to have certain army units participated in the coup.
Finally, Mussadiq fell in August of 1953. With Mussadiq out of the way, the Eisenhower administration rushed to support General Zahedi, who had already been chosen to replace Mussadiq as the prime minister. The US provided Iran with $68 million, mounting to roughly one third of the total revenue Iran had lost as a result of the British oil embargo. Over $300 million in additional US economic aid was given to Iran during the next ten years. The United States also began a major effort to strengthen Shah's security forces soon after the coup, reorganizing and training his domestic intelligence apparatus and giving him almost $600 million in military assistance during the next decade. l6 As a result, Iran's economy grew rapidly. With the more effective security apparatus in place, Shah consolidated his grip on power in the late 1950s and early 1960s. By late 1963, this process had been completed: Shah presided over an authoritarian, repressive regime under which organized opposition to his authority was not tolerated, and there seemed little chance that he would fall from power.
For twenty six years, Iran was a virtual colony of the US corporations and the Pentagon. During these years, the process of Iran's integration into the global capitalist market dominated by the US was consolidated. Iran's role, along with other countries in the region was to deliver cheap oil and receive mostly finished consumer commodities.
1 George D. Moffett III, Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1991.
2 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51.
3 David Lesch, The Middle East and the United States, page 52.
4 Ibid., page 24.
5 John Waller Interview, December 1982, RG59, 891.105A/2 July 1948, Wiley to Henderson.
6 RG 319, Plans and Operations Division (P&O), o91 Iran, eLettersi 17 February 1947, Schwarzkopf to Colonel Pottenger.
7 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51.
8 Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973: A study of Foreign Policy in Modernizing Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1975) PP. 159-162; Confidential interview conducted by Mark Gasiorowki with several CIA officers stationed in Iran during this period.
9 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51, page 83.
10 NSC, The position of the United States with Respect to Iran, NSC 107/2, June 27, 1951.
11 James Goode, The United States and Iran, 1946-51, Page 89.
12 Henry Byroade, interview by Mark Gasiorowski, Potomac, Maryland, August 7, 1984; Record of Interdepartmental Meeting, March 20, 1951, Foreign Office 371/91525.
13 George D. Moffett III, Christian Science Monitor Date, March 20, 1991.
14 Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle, pp. 244-246; confidential interviews conducted by Mark Gasiorowski with several CIA officers from that era.
15 Talk about why US and Britain worked together??????chk with AT
16 Mark Gasiorowski, US Foreign policy and the Shah, Ch. 4.
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Part 2: Iran and the Revolution
Why the need for the Revolution?
Since Shah was serving America's interest so well, the question comes to mind is why he was removed from power. Was there a sincere and honest to goodness revolution which brought Khomeni to power? In this section we will demonstrate that it was the United States who used Khomeini and his colleagues to oust the Shah.
The American administration, under President Carter, charged that the CIA had failed in its mission to protect the Shah. However, such a claim must be completely rejected because, as mentioned in the previous sections that there were more than 40,000 American military advisors in Iran who worked in the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as in the security offices (SAVAK), and the oil companies. These advisors had the most sophisticated spying devices and were free to move within Iran as well as in the Gulf region. They also constituted one seventh of the Iranian army. For every F-14 and F-15, there was an American advisor. Then, how can anyone believe that what happened in Iran was a surprise to the CIA? A more convincing theory is that the CIA wanted to remove Shah from power. There are several reasons that support this claim:
Shah wanted to build an empire that he claimed would be the sixth greatest power in the world. To make his dream a reality, he wanted to buy the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the world. To accomplish this, the Shah spent more than $20 billion in the military field. This was a great concern for the U.S. because this would create an imbalance between Iran and its neighbors. Such a point was mentioned in the documents seized from the Embassy, right after the revolution. One of these documents stated that the Iranian military buildup would have serious consequences on the future cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. at that time was supporting. 17 This relationship was strategically important in securing the Gulf region. In addition, the Iranian arms buildup might have forced Iraq to move closer to the Soviet Union for protection and armaments, which consequently could have increased the rise in armaments in the region, jeopardizing U.S. efforts to have a friendly relationship with Baghdad. 18
Shah visited the USSR and met with some of leaders by his initiative, which angered the U. S. America's patience ran out when Shah began dealing with the Americans as an independent partner. In an interview with U.S. News & World Report, Shah said that if the U.S. would take an unfriendly attitude towards Iran, then Iran "can hurt you (U.S.) as badly, if not more so, than you can hurt us (Iran). Not just through oil, we can create trouble for you in the region. If you force us to change our friendly attitude, the repercussions will be immeasurable."19
Concern over Shah's attitude towards the oil policies, which differed from America's point of view. This was another point mentioned in the seized documents from the American Embassy in Tehran.
Therefore, how would US remain silent when a third world leader was revolting? In an interview with Muhammed Hasanayn Heikal, the Egyptian Journalist, Shah said, "Some people accuse me of being an American puppet, but give me one reason why I should accept such a role You have no idea the number of clashes I have had with the Americans. The last of these was over OPEC. The Americans wanted to break it up from the inside and tried to do so. The Saudis were terrified. It was I who had to bear the brunt of the confrontation. I can exercise power on my own. Why should I want to exercise power on behalf of somebody else?"20 The CIA, as it is well known, had brought Shah back to power, after Mussadiq, and protected him for twenty-seven years. The entire American presence in Iran was in danger and for U.S. this was a life-and-death issue.
Shah was quiet aware of the CIA's involvement in his country. He said, in a private conversation with some American visitors, that he received some reports that the Americans were involved with a few oil companies during some of the most recent riots in the country. Shah said in an interview with Dean Brellis and Parvis Raeim from Time Magazine that the CIA began making contact within dissident ranks fifteen years ago so that the U.S. would have influence with anyone who might manage to overthrow him.2 1 Also, he said that "if he left the throne, thousands would die in the ensuing fight," and if that happened, he feels that "Communist forces would take control of what would then be a bankrupt and fragmented country.~22 When Shah became sixty years old, he did not have a strong party to inherit his policies. The people wanted him out because of corruption, though many had valued the things he did. They wanted somebody else to lead them. The strongest alternative to Shah was Khomeini, especially during a time when Islam became a hot topic in the region. Shah accused the CIA of being behind the plot to get rid of him and of having strong relations with his opposition. While, Khomeini was the head of that opposition.
Khomeni's Role in the Revolution
Can it be right what Shah said? How can anybody believe this accusation and at the same time believe in the asceticism which surrounded Khomeini? First, we would like to mention Khomeini ideological understanding. He says about Tuqi'a (dissimulation),
which means "legitimacy to lie if it is beneficial." Additionally, Khomeini said: "If the circumstances of Tuqi'a forces anyone of us to enter the Sultan's doors, we should not do it even if it causes murder, unless his seeming treachery causes a real victory for Islam and the Muslims like the treachery of Ali bin Yekteen and Nasir ad-Deen Tusi."23 Thus, Khomeini took Tusi as the ideal figure to follow. Tusi, as every Muslim should know, was the Vizir of the Criminal Holakou. Tusi guided Holakou to the Baghdad massacres some seven hundred years ago. If Khoemin considered Tusi as a role model then what's the big deal for him to have a relationship with US?
Khomeini added: "...it is natural that Islam permit us to enter the Tyrant's establishments if the real aim is to stop oppression or to make a coup de'tat. Against the people in power, this "treachery" will be mandatory, and there is no doubt about it."24 It is obvious that Khomeini saw the deal and cooperation with the enemies of the Muslims as mandatory if it benefited his sector. As a result, Khomeini claimed that it was permissible for Tusi to serve the Tartar invaders and used it to justify his cooperation between him and the CIA on the notion that it was beneficial for him and his country.
Some would still find it hard to believe that Khomeini had a relationship with the Americans while attacking the US at the same time? In this regard, we should remind ourselves of Abdul Nasser who used to badmouth U.S. in the media and U.S. would do the same. However, Nasser was a US puppet. Miles Copeland, the CIA operative in the region, used to write his speech in which he heavily criticizes the U.S. along with making the announcement to buy arms from Czechoslovakia.25From this, we can see how a leader from the Third World can appear to be an enemy of the U.S. but in reality is a puppet. Consequently, American agents can wear several masks and we have to be aware of this.
The US - Khomeni Relationship
There are tremendous amounts of information which link Khoemin with the Americans. He served their agenda and purpose regardless of his intention. The American influence in the region was deeply rooted and remains until today. US-Khomeni relationship is obvious based upon the following evidences:
Intro. To the following meeting especially the Bruce
1. By the late 1978, many in the Embassy and in the State Department were convinced that the Shah could not last and were in contact with secular and religious figures that might enter a governmental position26. Shah sent a leek to the Iraqi government accusing the CIA of what happened in Iran, telling Iraq that the U.S. was trying to change the political systems in the region by using religion and that Baghdad's turn would be next. The Shah asked Iraq to watch Khomeini more closely because he had
connections with the CIA. Some news from the Iranian Palace accused the former Information Minister, Dayrysh Homayun, of publishing an article in Ettala'at violently attacking Khomeini and of having a connection with the CIA, which ordered the distribution of this article and initiated the riots against the Shah as a result.27 All of this gave Khomeni great amount of publicity.
Note: give background info of what the dialogue really means do not leave it up to the reader to assumed that his is an agent. Also mention the dialogue was continuos not just once or twice.
On January 21, 1979, the former Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, arrived in Paris from Tehran. He held some talks with the opposition leader Khomeini and told him Carter's opinions of the recent events. As the news agencies reported, when Clark left Khomeini, he said, "I have a great hope that this revolution will bring social justice to Iranian people." 28
An interview with the Sudanese leader, Sadeq Al-Mehdi, in Al-Mostaqbal magazine, convinces us that the American administration used him as a mediator in the hostage crisis by visiting Khomeini. He added that this was not the first time he mediated between the American administration and Khomeini.29
Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, said in a conversation with the Iranian newspaper, Iyianadjan, which Reuter broadcasted on August 7, 1979, that Carter warned Khomeini to be careful, if Bakhtiar did not support the Revolution. This warning was in a letter which two French presidential envoys carried to Khomeini in exile on Neauphle Le Chateau in France. What is important here is the letter and the warning which Carter gave to Khomeni.
NBC news reported that Sheikh Al-Islam Reza Al-Shirazy, one of the religious figures in Iran, had secret medical treatment for four months in Minnesota. The network reported that Al-Shirazy was wounded in an assassination attempt in July 1979. A speaker of the State Department said that there is no relation between Al-Shirazy and the Revolutionary Council in Iran, but he is a friend of Khomeini. However, the network did not report whether Shirazy left the U.S. at that time.30 Why was the U.S. so loyal to Khomeini while he held some American hostages? And how did the Americans know the names of the Revolutionary Council while we know the names were secret?
5. The Meeting between Bruce Laingen and Khomeini Laingen, the American Charge D' Affairs in Tehran, held three meetings with Khomeini in Qom in mid-August, 1979. He also held a fourth meeting with him in Tehran while Khomeini was making a short visit there. Right after the meeting, the riots took place in Ahwas that reduced the oil supply, and the result was a shortage in the gasoline supply. The U.S. then supplied the needs of Iran, and Congress, at that time, uncovered the secret deal.
At the same time, the Kurdish revolt occurred, which made Tehran import the spare parts and equipment from the U.S. to operate their fighter planes and troop carriers. Al-Watan Al-Arabia magazine from Paris stated that the first meeting between Laingen and Khomeini took place in Qom, accompanied by revolutionary guards, and that Laingen was carrying a file about the Kurdish revolt and the financial support of the Kurds by Russia. The magazine added that the Iranian cargo planes used Madrid as a refueling station on the trip between the U.S. and Iran to carry the spare parts, after an eight-month cut in the supply.3 1
Furthermore, Yazdi confirmed in an interview with the Associated Press, that there were talks with the American government about sending spare parts for at least part of the military equipment, as he stated, which Iran had, and these parts did arrive in Iran.32 On August 11, 1979, The Daily Telegraph said that there was a termination of the U.S. arms deals except those for spare parts.
There is no doubt that there was mediation between the U.S. and Khomeini via Al-Mehdi and Clark, or via the French envoys from the presidential office of the French Republic. From this news, there is clear evidence about the connections between Carter the "Satan" and Khomeini the "Angel." At this point, we would like to cite three pertinent sources:
Some declarations from the Shah; Khomeini's partners who disagreed with him after the Revolution succeeded; the Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Watan.
Evidence from Shah's Memoirs
Shah said in his memoirs, that he did not know about Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe General Huyser's arrival in Tehran until a few days after its occurrence. Shah also said that this was strange because the General "had come to Tehran a number of times, scheduling his visits well in advance to discuss military affairs with me and my generals."33 However, this arrival was secret. Shah stated that his generals did not know anything about his arrival. He continued by saying:
"As soon as Moscow learned of Huyser's arrival, Pravada reported, 'General Huyser is in Tehran to foment a military coup.' In Paris, the International Herald Tribune wrote that Huyser had not gone to Tehran to 'foment' a coup but to 'prevent' one."34
"Did such a risk exist? I do not believe so. My officers were tied to the Crown and to
the Constitution by an oath of loyalty, but the different American information services had perhaps solid reasons to think that the Constitution would be abused. It was therefore necessary to neutralize the Iranian army. It was clearly for this reason that General Huyser had come to Tehran."35
Then Shah said:
"Huyser succeeded in winning over my last chief of staff, General Ghara-Baghi, whose later behavior leads me to believe that he was a traitor. He asked Ghara-Baghi to arrange a meeting for him with Mehdi Bazargan, the human rights lawyer who became Khomeini's First Prime Minister. The General informed me of Huyser's request before I left, but I have no idea of what ensued. I do know that Ghara-Baghi used his authority to prevent military action against Khomeini. He alone knows what decisions were made and the price paid. It is perhaps significant that although all my generals were executed, only General Ghara-Baghi was spared. His savior was Behdi Bazargan.
"By the time Huyser left Iran, the Army had been destroyed, and the Bakhtiar government he had supposedly come to save was in shambles."36
Shah said that he met Huyser only one time during his visit to Tehran. He was accompanied by Sullivan, the American Ambassador. According to the Shah, the only thing they thought about was when he was going to leave Iran.37
Shah said after the revolution:
"At the travesty of a trial which preceded the execution of General Rabbii, the Commander of the Iranian Air Force, the General told his 'judges' that General Huyser threw the Shah out of the country like a dead mouse."38
Shah ended by saying that plans for his departure had been announced, "interestingly enough, on January 11 in Washington by U.S. Secretary of State Vance."39
A Testimony From Khomeini's Partners
Among those who supported Khomeini were the National Front, Sanjabi, Feda'iyan, and Majahedian Khalq, and they all disagreed with Khomeini. The reporter Houda Al-Hocine from Al-Hawadess met with these people, and she reported an important story as follows:
"These new revolutionaries rejected Khomeini's revolution because they said the revolution carried America's blessing and they consider America as the force behind the fall of the Shah and therefore, were backing Khomeini. They gave evidence by saying that America's president Carter was against Shah since the beginning for these reasons:
1. The Shah was having a feud with the Democratic Party, and most of the members of Congress were against the Shah because the Shah considered himself a leading hawk from the OPEC and led the campaign of raising the oil prices.
2. After the coup in Ethiopia's, the U.S. was planning to take the initiative in Iran to protect its interests after the loss of her largest base in Asmara, Ethiopia. Shah was also getting old and the Crown Prince was too young. Thus, the U.S. was looking for a solution that would protect American interests, either through the Pahlavi family or through someone else. The American interest was the important thing. Americans then noticed the Communist activities that began to take its position by organized terrorist activities. Also, they found that the Soviet Union was the only beneficiary from the situation to gain whatever natural resources they wanted from Iran, especially natural gas. Afghanistan invasion took place, as well as the incidents in the Horn of Africa and South Yemen. This made Iran under the mercy of the leftist wave. Therefore, the situation had to be salvaged.
A coup de'tat was not acceptable by the Iranian people. Therefore, the change had to be from the people who could be incited by a revolution that would depend on religion. Accordingly, the Americans looked for a religious personality that was Khomeini.
The Americans did not keep an eye on Yazdi, which meant that he did not need to be monitored. Also, it meant that they knew who were the influential personalities.
Huyser came to Iran and spent all of January there after Shahpour Bakhtiar's government was assembled to persuade the Shah to temporarily go into exile and to persuade the army not to rebel but instead to support Bakhtiar. They used Bakhtiar to deport the Shah.
As soon as the revolution was won, the army commander said that the American advisors should come back and the oil would be pumped once again to the Western countries, including the United States. As soon as the American Embassy had been attacked, Ibrahim Yazdi went by himself to stop it. (The Army Commander was Muhammed Waly Karny).
The American advisors paid their rent three months in advance for their houses when they left Iran.
There was an attempt to destroy Khomeini's movement on the night of February 1 l, but something unexplainable made the attempt fail. The army announced that it was standing neutral. This announcement changed the core of events. The orders were given to the army and to the Embassy's guards to drop their weapons.
The Al-Watan reported uncovered some secrets. One of them mentions that "the United States explicitly asked the army commanders and generals to take this attitude at the last moment, and the State Department urged Ambassador Sullivan to persuade the senior generals, as soon as possible, not to intervene in any offensive action and to announce their neutrality in the political feuds."
That is what happened and after the Air Force revolt, General Ghara-Baghi, whom the Shah spoke of in his memoirs, ordered his forces to return to their camps and to avoid more riots and new bloodshed. At the same time, on February 14, the general met with the army commander. They issued a communiqué that stated:
"To prevent disorder and bloodshed, the superior body of the army decided to keep neutral in the recent political feud, and for this reason, an order was given to all the soldiers to return to their units and barracks. The Ambassador said that the reason for this was the possibility of a dangerous conflict between the army and the people, and the fear that the leftist world infiltrates and benefit from the conflict between Khomeini and the army. It was also to preserve the strength of the army to play a future role similar to the role which 'Suharto' played in Indonesia or to the role the generals played in a coup in Chile against Salvador Allende. The Ambassador added that the United States might have resorted to a military coup de'tat if the revolution got out of hand and they failed to contain it."40
17"Above the Doubt Documents -- Part II," Ministry of Islamic directive -- Iran. P. 195, document dated 1976.
19 A False Sense of Security will Destroy you, US News & World Report, March 22, 1976, p. 57-58.
20 Muhammad H. Heikal, Iran: The Untold Story (New York Pantheon Books, 1982), p. 108-109.
21 The Shah is Not Giving Up, Time, November 27, 1978, p. 35.
23 Ayatollah Khomeini, The Islamic Government, p.128.
24 Ayatollah Khomeini, Walgaht Al-Faqih, pp. 142-143.
25 Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), pp. 133-134.
26 Christian Science Monitor, December 6, 1978, p. 2.
27 Al-Hawadess, No. 1156, London, December 29, 1978, p.13.
28 Al-Hawadess, No. 1161, London, Feb. 3, 1979, p. 26.
29 Al-Mostaqbal .....
30 NBC News, January 19, 1980.
31 Al-Watan Al-Arabi, No. 139, October 11-17, 1979, p.32.
32 Al-Hawadess, No. 1183, London, July 10, 1979, p.47.
33 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.
36 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.
39 Muhammed Reza Pahlavi, Answer to History (New York: Stein & Day, 1980), pp. 172-173.
40 Fashal Mohawlat Intelap Daid Al-Khomeini," Al-Watan, Kuwait, March 18, 1979, p. 1.
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Part 3: Iran and the Revolution
Divergent views about US-Iranian Relationship in US
There was a dispute in the U.S. between the two parties regarding the removal of Shah. The Republicans mainly opposed such a move. But, Carter and his aides supported Khomeini without any doubt, and here are some facts to show this: Time magazine published on March 5, 1979, a declaration from Carter responding to his opposition saying, "Those who argue that the U.S. could or should intervene directly to thwart these events are wrong about the realities of Iran."41 President Carter, in his memoirs Keeping Faith, talked about Huyser's mission to Iran by saying:
Huyser believed the military had made adequate plans to protect its the equipment and installations, and that it would stay off the streets. He had dissuaded some of its leaders from attempting a coup and from moving out of other parts of Iran into the more stable southern part."42 Furthermore, President Carter praised Khomeini's first Prime Minister by saying:
He and his predominantly Western-educated cabinet members cooperated with us. They protected our embassy, provided safe travel for General Philip C. Gast, who had replaced Huyser, and sent us a series of friendly messages. Bazargan announced publicly his eagerness to have good relations with the U.S. and said that Iran would soon resume normal oil shipments to all its customers."43
President Carter also praised Khomeini when he said:
Khomeini sent his personal representative to see Secretary Vance to pledge increased friendship and cooperation, and to seek our assurance that we were supporting the new Prime Minister and a stable government. Despite the turmoil within Iran, I was reasonably pleased with the attitude of the Iranian government under Bazargan."44
In an interview with the former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown had with CBS program, Face the Nation, he said that the Bazargan government was very helpful in trying to protect Americans in a difficult and unstable, dangerous situation. He added that America can work out friendly relations.45 At that time, the assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs Harold H. Sanders said in his report before the Middle East Committee: "The American interests did not change in Iran, and we have a strong interest to keep Iran a stable, free, and independent state."46 It is true that the American interests in Iran did not change and that the American administration knows best about their interests, especially because they worship their interests. If their interests were in danger, they would take the proper type of action to do what is best about the matter as Carter stated earlier (see above). Leaders of the Republican Party, on the other hand, bitterly opposed. George Bush described Carter as a liar, and he noted that during Carter's visit to Iran on December 31, 1977, the former president said, "Iran, because of the great leadership of the Shah, is an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world." Bush made a remark about this part of Carter's speech saying that Carter, "at the time, was giving the secret code to the CIA to start destroying Shah's authority." And, as we know, Bush was serving in the CIA, and he was familiar with their tactics.47 On January 7, 1978, the first riots erupted in Iran. Nevertheless, there was a battle between Kissinger and Carter's National Secretary Advisor, Brzezinski. The first blamed the second of hatching a conspiracy against the Shah, and he criticized Carter's attitude towards the Shah, who served the American interests for more than 26 years. In an interview with The Economist on February 10, 1979, which then published a book, Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, showed his support for the Shah. He also showed that the American policy at that time was deliberately directed to oust the Shah.48 As it is clearly evident from these sources --The Shah's memoirs, the accounts of Khomeini's partners, and the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Watan -- Huyser neutralized the army, and it was not coincidence that different political figures agreed to blame the United States. This blame was reasonable to anybody who followed the core of events which came before Khomeini's victory.
Bazargan's Attitude towards the United States
In the rest of this section, we would like to bring some proclamations from Bazargan about his country's attitude towards the West, his speech from Tehran radio voicing his opinion of the West, as well as a document from the students who held the hostages and found documents in the American Embassy. One of these documents shows that Bazargan was an agent of the United States, but we believe that Khomeini intervened in favor of his friend, which pacified the students.
In a speech with the New York Times, Bazargan said that his government is willing to maintain a good relationship with the United States, and he renewed his apology about the attack on the American Embassy in Tehran during the first days of his government in office. Regarding the oil exports, Bazargan said that his country will begin exporting soon to all the world including the United States.49
Islamic Republic Party (IRP) as an Agent of the U.S.
Hajuat Al-Islam Ali Tehrani, a religious figure in Mashad, sent a letter to Khomeini charging three Ayatollahs, among tl1em Ayatollah Beheshti, the Secretary of the Revolution Council, of having a connection witl1 the United States and attempting to take over the authority. Hajuat Al-Islam, in his letter, published in the Islamic Republic newspaper on January l 9, 1980, charged Beheshti, Hash RaLsanjani, a former Minister of Interior (the current president), and Ali-Khameni, the former Imam of Tehran's Mosque and the current spiritual leader, of trying to seize the authority by nominating Jalaeddin Farsi to represent the IRP in the election. He also said that it is the students' duty to uncover the documents they found in the Embassy which will prove that these three figures are guilty together with Abbas Amir Entezam, the former government spokesman who was imprisoned as a spy for the United States.50
Abbas Amir Entezam, one of key figure was known to be a CIA agent. After the occupation of the Iranian Embassy, some documents were discovered which confirmed his relationship with the CIA.51
Rouhani: "The Americans Gave Us the Green Light"
In an interview with Paris-Match magazine, Ayatollah Hamid Rouhani said:
"The army was in the hands of its 40,000 American advisors. From the moment when America gave the green light -- and I am convinced that America gave us the green light -- the army could no longer do anything except what it is doing today: An honorable fight in fidelity to its oath to the Shah. When it understands that it is face to face with a revolution and not just a riot, it will fall into the hands of the people."52
Habibi was the Revolution Council's spokesman, and once he was a nominee for the Iranian presidency. He has been accused by more than one organization in Iran, and his name was brought forth in Counter Spy magazine with the information that he had been called to the U.S. when he officially entered the CIA on May 15, 1963.53
Yazdi studied for sixteen years in tl1e United States, and he had both the American citizenship along with his Iranian citizenship (his wife and children carried only the American citizenship).54 Yazdi was formerly responsible for the activities and the hostile demonstrations against the Shah when he visited the White House in November of 1977. The newspapers found it strange, at the time, that Carter did not take the proper kind of action against the demonstrators.55
In a talk with the United States Press on March l, l 979, Senator Jim Abu Rezk said that he gave Khomeini's representative, Ibrahim Yazdi, some political as well as non-political support in Washington. He also helped to free the students who had been arrested in the demonstration against the Shah on February 2, 1978. When Yazdi was the Foreign Minister, it was his idea of not cutting but improving relations with the U.S.56 He also negotiated with some American figures to import some military spare parts. Yazdi, together with Bazar, an agent ,Brezezinski in Algiers in November 1, 1979, three days before the American Embassy had been taken over.
Yazdi is still active in Iran. He is the leader of the "liberation movement of Iran": an opposition movement working with in the system to give the Iranian system legitimacy.
As we can see, the high figures in the Iranian Revolution did have a connection with the United States. After all of this, how can we believe that the Revolution was clean. This is also reinforced from the Islamic point of view which forbids the Muslims to cooperate with the enemies of Allah, the enemies of Islam, and the enemies of the Muslims. Also, if we examine the Iranian Constitution, we will find that, although it is good for a Western country, it has no similarity to the Islamic Constitution which would define an Islamic country. We can criticize the Iranian Constitution from the Islamic perspective, but it is not the subject of this paper.
After all this evidence, how could anybody believe that Khomeini was an Islamic leader or that he was sent to bring justice? Some may argue that there were some polluted figures in the Revolution, that Khomeini did not know, or that he knew about them and tried to eliminate them. This is not the first time in recent history that this occurred, as when Nasser claimed to be the leader for the Arabs. The same thing happened in Iran, except that instead of Nasser carrying the slogan of Pan-Arabism, Khomeini carried the slogan of Islam.
The imperialist nations are always thinking ahead and they have to, to maintain their domination in the world. After brining Khomeini to power, the US had already made a back up plan of bringing "secularist" to power, in case the revolution failed or got out of hands. However, the revolution succeeded. Now, the US had to control it, so that the situation did not get out of hands. In pursuing this policy, Iraq's Saddam Hussein was 'encouraged' to attack Iran. Saddam Hussein thought that the Iran "could not withstand an attack for long, because its air force was nonexistent. The army had a combat capability of zero, the navy 10 percent. The Iraqi were not far of the mark", Bani Sadr wrote in his book. Bani Sadr continues, "and had they [Iraqis] attacked then, would have had every chance of a rapid victory. But they had not received the green light from the United States."57
Coming to power with the United States assistanh58, Khomeini was certain that no one would attack Iran. Saddam on the other hand was certain that the war would be a simple exercise. who put these ideas into their heads, Bani Sadr asks in his book.
In July of 1980, Carter's national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, had met Saddam Hussein . He prepared a report for Carter, "explaining that the Iran-Iraq war was consistent with American policy in the region."59
On September 22, 1980, Iraq attacked Iran. With in hours, Iraqi tanks crossed Iranian borders at several points and the Iranian air bases were bombed. Iran was able to survive the initial Iraqi attacks and launched their own attacks after a few days. So, began the long 8 years of Iran-Iraq war, where Muslims were the only losers. Nearly 30O,000 Muslims died, just from the Iran side.
For the American government, this is nothing new. The history has proven that they are able to wipe a whole race just for the measly worldly possession, such as the case with the American Indians. For the Persian Gulf, American strategy was simple, which was to destabilize the region, by having one boogie man. Khomenie was a perfect man for this job. In the end, it was the US economy which benefited from this policy of destabilization. The Saudi's stepped up oil production as a result of the war and thus made the 'black gold' cheap for the Americans.
To maximize their gain, the Americans supplied weapons to both Iran and Iraq. It was reported that "the US subsidiaries all around the world found Iran to be an excellent customer because the Mullah paid top market prices."60
Initially, the US began to support Iraq with weapon and intelligence in 1982, when it appeared that Iran might be winning.6 1 The Regan administration secretly decided to provide highly classified intelligence to Iraq in the spring of 1982, while also permitting the sale of American-made arms to Baghdad in a successful effort to help Saddam Hussein avert imminent defeat in the war with Iran, former intelligence and State Department officials say. The American decision to lend crucial help to Baghdad so early in the war came after American intelligence agencies warned that Iraq was on the verge of being overrun by Iran, whose army was bolstered the year before by convert shipment of American-made weapons. The New York Times and others reported last year that the Regan administration secretly decided shortly after taking office in January 1981 to allow Israel to ship several billion dollars worth of American arms and spare parts to Iran."62
Iran was even forced to buy the American weapons, to defend against Iraq. The Americans urged Iraq to carry out air strikes deep inside Iran. The plan was conceived during the Iran-lraq war as pressure tactic intended to force Iran to turn to the United States for sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons to repel the Iraqi attacks. The United States could then use its increased leverage with Iran to press Teheran to free
American hostages being held by pro-lranian groups in Lebanon. When asked about this information, White House spokeswoman, Laura Mellilo, told Reuters 'This is nothing new."'63
Americas objectives were being achieved by this war. There was a deliberate attempt to create no winners, no losers in order to keep the area destabilized. As a result, America was "gaining control of the revolution, control over OPEC was reestablished... Three other objectives described in the reports seized in the embassy were as yet unattained: using the Iran-Iraq war to gain a foothold in the Persian Gulf, stabilizing the regimes in the region, and establishing military bases for the American strike forces."64 (This situation w as early the Iran-Iraq war. However, as we know, these goals are now already achieved by the US.)
When it seemed like Iran was gaining an edge in the war, the Americans decided to go all out to help Iraq even overtly, because the United States did not want the revolution to get out of hand. To help Iraq, Washington removed it from the list of nations supporting terrorism, enabling trade with the US to resume. Agricultural Sales and export-import bank credits were restored, as were diplomatic relations. "The US also shared with Iraq, military intelligence on the deployment of Iranian forces. 'Operation Staunch', was launched to stem the flow of arms to Iran. Washington turned an indifferent eye toward allied arms deals with Baghdad."65
In 1987, Iraq was becoming desperate. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons on Iran. An important question comes to mind is that who provided Iraqis with technology and the know how to deliver these chemical weapons? [Band Sadr mentions in his book that, the Soviets and Germans supplied the plans and training, and the French sold them 40 percent of the guns So, where did the other 60 percent of the guns to deliver the chemical weapons come from?]
By now it was obvious that the United States wanted the war to end. Most of their objectives were being fulfilled. Now they wanted to get Saddam Hussien, who had been in the British camp to join the American camp, like Iran.
By mid-1987, the American Navy started escorting Kuwaiti tankers (bearing US flags) through the Strait of Hormz and punished Iran for interfering with the tankers. The same year an Iranian airliner was shot down, killing 290 Muslims. This was seen "as the precursor of other catastrophes. if Iran did not immediately agree to the cessation of hostilities."66
On July 20, 1988 Iran accepted the cease-fire. After agreeing to cease-fire agreement, Khomeini declared publicly, I have sold my honor; I have swallowed the poison of defeat.i~67
As expected, the Americans profited from both the war and its conclusion.
It is well known that during and after the Iran-Iraq war, Americans were building Iraq in hope of making him the "police man" of the Gulf, or at least to deter Iran from taking any 'threatening' moves. This strategy appeared in may State Department document beginning in the fall of 1988, but it did not appear in a major policy document until presidential National Security Directive NSD-26, signed by President Bush on October 2, 1988. The directive stated:
"Normal relations between tile US and Iraq world serve our long-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq... [Also], we should pursue and seek to facilitate opportunities for US firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy... where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation .. objectives.... The US should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchanges."68
Policy of trying to build up Iraq to be the policeman failed miserably, leading to the Gulf 'war'. We are not going to discuss this war at any length, because it is out of the scope of the discussion. Seeing their failure, the US changed its policy from building up Iran or Iraq to "a strategy of dual containment". "This policy departs from the past US practice of helping to build ~,~ one of the countries in hopes of balancing the other's military and political influence" a US official said. He also said, "the new US objective is to ensure that both Iran and Iraq remain equally weak for an indefinite period. The [Clinton] administration's principal approach is to ensnare both countries in a tight web of international trade restrictions meant to deprive them of the income and technology they need to develop new armaments' pursue terrorism, foment revolutions or intimidate their neighbors."69
41 Iran Time Magazine, March 5, 1979.
42 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President, New York: Bantam Books, 1982, p. 449
43 Ibid., p. 450.
44 Ibid., p, 452.
45 "Face the Nation," CBS, February 25, l 979.
46 Al-Hawadess, No. 1 163, London, February 16, 1979, p.29.
48 Henry Kissinger, For the Record: Selected Statements, 1977-1980 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 198 l ), pp. 17.- 187.
49 New York Times, February l 8, l 979, pp. 1, 14
50 Islamic Republic, January 19, 1980, p.2
51 "NVDI comments on Entezam A Test," FBIS, December 26, 1979, pp. Sup. 23-24
52 George Menant, Translation by Dr. Marshall Windmiller, "A interroge L'ayatollah Rouhani Chef de la communaute chiite d'Europe," Paris Match, No. 1550, February 19, 1979, pp. 64-65
53 John Kelly, "The CIA in the Middle East," Counter Spy, November/December 1978, p. 13
54 Al-Hawadess, No. 1171, p. 37.
55 Al-Nahan Arab and international, Paris, May 20, 1978.
56 Carter, p. 453
57 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, Page 69.
58 Iran Times, October 20, 1989, Page 8., A quote by Richard Cottam, an Iranian specialist and a professor- at the University of Pittsburgh.
59 Ibid., page 70.
60 Newsday, March 20, 1991, Page 6.
61 Howard Teicher and Gayle Radley Teicher, Twin Pillars to Desert Storm: America's Flawed Vision in the Middle East from Nixon to Bush. (New York: William Morrow and Co. 1993.)
62 New York Times, Sunday, January 26, 1992.
63 Ibid., New Yorker Magazine, November 2, l 992.
64 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 144.
65 Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1992.
66 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 214.
67 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 215
68 The White House, presidential documents, Presidential Determination Number 90-7 of January 17, 1990, Application of export-import Bank Restrictions in Connection with Iraq, P. 1.
69 The Washington Post, Sunday, May 23, 1993.
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Part 4: Iran and the Revolution
Rafsanjani the moderate
After Khomeniis death, the existing organizations will try to change the country, each in a different way. The people are aware of this, and the United States will support any government that restores freedom and democracy."70 These are the words of Ronald Regan. After reading this, it is easy to analyze where the current regime of Iran is headed.
After Khomeniis death, sure enough Hashemni Rafsanjani became the president. He is the current president. Although, according to the Iranian Constitution, a president can only serve two-4 year teens. But, since Rafsanjani is paving the way to moderation", the Iranian Majlis is in the process of changing the constitution so that Rafsanjani to can become president for a third time. Rafsanjani has maintained contact with the Americans since the revolution. For' example, back in December of 1986, "the Heritage Foundation mentioned a prospective rapprochement with the Khomeini regime on four points, which also served as the basis for relations between Rafsanjani and George Bush. They were: organization of the oil market, stabilization of the regime, the release of political prisoners, and the end to the Iran-Iraq war as an investment in the American elections 1988.-71
Just three months after Khomeini's death, the newly elected President Hashemi Rafsanjani moved swiftly to end Iran's political and economic isolation. He excluded from his Cabinet former Interior minister Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the chief patron of anti-Western terrorist in Lebanon, and hardline former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mouisssvi. We'll have more surprises now, says; R.K. Ramazani, an Iran expert at the University of Virginia.72 A big surprise did come during the Gulf War, when Iran declared its neutrality in the war. When Iraq flew its cream of the Iraqi air force to Iran. Even American General Norman Schwarzkopf was surprised. No clear explanation came from Tehran. iRat:sanjani did assure the US-led coalition, however, that the decision to provide sanctuary to some of Saddamis most sophisticated French and Soviet fighters and most of his SU-24 Gencer bombers would not affect Iran's neutral status. The planes, Iranian officials said, will be impounded and held until hostilities end. They also insisted that no deal had been cut with Baghdad in advance."73
From the beginning of l~is presidency iRafsanjani has worked quietly to improve ties with Washington... So fa~, Rafsanja'~i l~as seceded on one major front: he has shed much of Iran's ultraconse~ ative i~nage and upgraded or restored time with many European and Middle Easte~n countries as well as Canada. ~74
Raisanjaniis ai~n is to ~nake Iran into a "moderate" state. His policies seem to be working. As Newsweel~ ~-eported, ~ ln Teheran, peeling slogans have been scrubbed off the walls... A capitalist-st~le stocl; n~arl;et is booming, children snap up Ninja Turtle toys and "Dancing with Wolves" is tl~e ilrst Hollywood movie to be screened legally in years."75
What about all the anti-American slogans we hear all the time from the various leaders in Iran. ~Anti-American rhetoric bv Isla~nic extremists in Tehran is not be taken seriously. eIt is for domestic, anti-i~nperialist consumption that the so-called radicals shout war mongering slo~rans against the Americans,' says an Iranian political scientist living in Paris. 'Even the~lranian revolutionary Guards are in no mood to join the hostilities."'76 Rafsanjani is known as the epragmatisti and a emoderatei, even if it means that he will abandon Allahis laws, he will do it. He is known to have eliberalize social codes). He il1as not actually called for a reversal of strict Islamic injunctions, but in oblique ways he is si~aling that he favors a more relaxed approach, especially in the enforcement of Hijab. In a m~cl~ publicized sennon last November, for example, Rafsanjani chided fellow clerics ~l~o make a virtue of 'austerity' and argued that 'appreciating beauty and seekin~ e~nbellisl~nent are serious feelings. To fight them is not God's desire."77 Ralsanjani als~' said, ithat young people were being asked to deny the esexual urged for too ion=, and tl~e ete~nporary marriage,~ (a Shiiite institution endorsing sexual liaisons for fi.xed ~eriods of time) ought to be more widely accepted. "78
Besides his eliberali anti-lslamic views, it is clear that RaLsanjani has been maintaining trade relation with the United States, despite calling it the eGreat Satan~. Shortly after hostage affair, Washington loosed r estrictions on trade with Tehran, and the US companies were allowed to sell Iran hardware. In March, 1991, American Mitac Corporation of Freemont CA., shipped $28 million worth of computers to Raymeh Saz Engineering Co. in lran. Anotl~er computer firms, Modular Computer Systems Inc. Of Fort Lauderdale, Fl., was given a license to ship $1.3 million worth of computer to the Iranian Chemical Co. Siemen, tl~e German electronics f~rm, received US approval to sell Iran's RaLsanjani industrial C o~nplex $241,000 worth of computers in 1991. It also sold Iran Telecom~m~nications Corp. $276,000 worth of electronic equipment that year. Rockwell Internatic~nal sold ~l ehran helicopter gear and electronics worth $533,000. Otl~er contracts went to Apple Computer, Sun Microsystems, Honeywell, NCR and AST Researcl~. Each sale was approved by the Commerce Department after consultation with other ~overnn~ent agencies. 79 Even after 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, wl~icl~ forbids iany transfer to Iran or Iraq of any goods or technology that cold be r~sed to mal~e advanced weapons~, the trade with the US has continued. The trade only dropped hom $747 million in 1992 to $616 million in 1993.80
After reading tllrougl~ tl~is paper, l~ow can anyone claim that Iran is an Islamic State. Those who still insist, need to re-read tl~e following Ayat of the Qur'an:
Take not Jews and Christian as yor~r Aulyat....
Just mear seeking aid and protection from the Jews and Christian would make us 'one of them' (a non-Muslim). S~rely Allah will cr~rse the person who actively is working to undermine and mix-represent Islan~, with the help of the Kuffar.
Again, Iran was chosen j.rist as an example to show how the Imperialist powers still manipulate the Muslim Ummah. Tl~e sih~ation in all of the other 'Muslim' countries in no different. May Allal~ protect the Mr~slims Ummah from the conspiracies of the West and bring back the true Islamic State, so tl~at this Ummah can rise up to its proper place and establish j~stice for not j~'st tl~e Mr~slims, but also for the non-Muslims.
70 Bani Sadr, My Tun1 To Speak, page 219.
71 Bani Sadr, My Turn To Speak, page 212.
72 Business Week, September I 1, 1989.
73 Time, Michael Serrill' February I 1, 1991.
74 Time, May 6, 1991.
75 Newsweek, April 27, 1992.
76 Time, February I 1, 1991.
77 Time, May 6, 1991.
78 Time, May 6, 1991.
79 US News & World Report, November 14, 1994.
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